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INTRODUCTION
Death and taxes, arguably may be certain; statistics, though
often a valuable predictive aid, usually are not.
-Judge Bruce M. Selyal
Following months of behavioral problems, hyperactivity, and
intermittent complaints of headache and nausea, five-year-old Kelsey
Craig's mother finally takes her to the pediatrician to determine the
root of the problem. After multiple consultations, a blood test shows a
surprising culprit: there is a dangerously high amount of lead present
in Kelsey's blood, suggesting prolonged exposure to the irreversibly
toxic substance. Upon returning to their older, prewar apartment
building, Kelsey's mother passes a neighboring family in the hallway
and woefully relays the tale of her diagnosis. The neighbors' eyes grow
wide as they realize their own five-year-old son has been experiencing
the very same symptoms. They immediately take him to the doctor and
a blood test confirms their fears: the child's lead levels are through the
roof.
A later inspection shows the toxic substance is present in
dangerously high levels in multiple units throughout the apartment
building. Amongst the affected tenants are five-year-olds Kelsey, John,
and Shaun, who each suffer identical injuries and resulting permanent
impairment. Kelsey is a Caucasian female with aspirations of becoming
a scientist; her single mother works as a server at the local diner and is
currently pursuing her GED. John is an African American male with
1. Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988).
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dreams of following in his parents' footsteps by becoming a doctor.
Shaun is a multiracial male who was adopted at birth; his parents each
hold doctorate degrees and are professors at the local university.
At trial, the jury quickly finds the landlord liable for his
negligence in failing to detect and otherwise remove the toxic lead-
based paint from the walls of the building. However, when it comes time
to award damages according to standard calculations based on life
expectancy and future lost earnings, the jury is at a loss. Should Kelsey
receive a smaller award than John and Shaun because she is a female,
and the average female earns less than the average male?2 Should
Shaun and John receive more than Kelsey because their parents are
highly educated and receive a higher salary than Kelsey's single
mother?3 Or should Kelsey receive more than both Shaun and John
because she is Caucasian and, statistically speaking, Caucasian people
earn more than African Americans and people of mixed racial descent?4
The gut reaction is certainly not-determining damages based
on these race-specific and gendered classifications would only
perpetuate existing systematic discrimination. These are simply five-
year-old children, and given their identical injuries and impairment,
they should receive equivalent awards. Awarding Kelsey less because
of her gender or awarding Kelsey more because of her race immediately
implicates constitutional concerns and issues of impracticability.5
Arguably, equal protection and due process are not vindicated through
a determination of worth based on race or gender. The very idea raises
a red flag by permitting the determination of a person's worth to be
predicated on innate phenotypic characteristics beyond their control.6
Further, even if these applications are constitutional, how could they
be accurately and consistently applied to all persons to guarantee a
sound result throughout the state and federal court systems?7
However, consideration is also owed to those adversely affected
by the exclusion of such data. From a defendant's standpoint and
through a corrective justice lens, the goal of the tort system is to
2. See Bernadette D. Proctor et al., Income and Poverty in the United States: 2015, U.S.
Census Bureau (Sept. 2016), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256
.html [https://perma.cc/R66D-KCR4] (indicating a 2015 female-to-male earnings ratio of 0.80).
3. For a study linking the influence of parental education and income on a child's ultimate
achievement, see Pamela E. Davis-Kean, The Influence of Parent Education and Family Income
on Child Achievement: The Indirect Role of Parental Expectations and the Home Environment, 19
J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 2, 294 (2005).
4. See Proctor et al., supra note 2.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Section IIB.
7. See id.
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accurately compensate the plaintiff for harms caused by the defendant.8
Through damages, the defendant is able to monetarily restore the
plaintiff to his or her former position. Ultimately, it is up to the jury to
determine the cost of this restoration. In situations concerning a
plaintiffs permanent impairment or death, determining this cost
requires juries to calculate future damages. This calculation often
begins with a chart known as a life table, which indexes the average
number of years of life remaining for an individual who has reached a
given age.9 Many life tables index this data by providing separate
columns for specific races and genders, and, notably, appreciable
differences in outcome can be found amongst the different categories.10
Thus, refusing to allow experts and juries to consider manifest
descriptors like race and gender, which objectively do correlate with
differing life expectancies and earning capacities, may seriously destroy
the accuracy of these awards.
Despite socially normative arguments against the employment
of race-based and gendered data when calculating civil damages, the
practice has long been met with cautious acceptance (and occasional
criticism)." However, recent judicial developments and proposed
legislation suggest hat perhaps this acceptance is waning.
In 2015, Judge Jack B. Weinstein2 of the Eastern District of
New York addressed the issue by altogether prohibiting the use of life
tables delineating life expectancy outcomes on the basis of race,
claiming, "it is unconstitutional .. . to premise projected societal and
8. However, it is not always the defendants who are negatively impacted by the exclusion of
race-based and gendered data. See infra Part II.
9. See Elizabeth Arias et al., U.S. Life Tables 2012, 61 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP. 1, 3 (2016),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr65/nvsr65-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DYG-X7CQ].
10. See, e.g., id.
11. See, e.g., Marvin R. Brams & Norfleet W. Rives, Jr., The Determination of Economic Loss
in Tort Cases: The Relative Impact of Sex and Race, 6 J. CONTEMP. L. 121, 127 (1979) (noting that
"[d]espite the inherent limitations of working life tables, they have been generally accepted by the
courts"); see also City of L.A. Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 725-26 ("Gender-
based actuarial tables have been in use since at least 1843, and their statistical validity has been
repeatedly verified."); Zuchowicz v. United States, Civ. No. 2-91-CV-1033 (WWE), 1996 WL
776585, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 1996), aff'd, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998) (calculating damages
based on the worklife table estimate of an average white female); The Saginaw and the Hamilton,
139 F. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1905) (relying on race-based statistics to determine damages in an admiralty
case involving white and "colored" defendants); Gilborges v. Wallace, 379 A.2d 269 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1997) (permitting the use of gender-based tables).
12. Judge Jack Weinstein
has, for more than a half-century, been a central figure in the law of evidence ... [and]
has greatly influenced developments in many fields of law, but perhaps nowhere more
than in the area of mass torts, where his management of the most complex cases has
been extraordinarily influential.
Jeffrey B. Morris, Jack B. Weinstein: Judicial Entrepreneur, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 393, 399 (2015).
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educational achievements on race or ethnicity to reduce tort
damages."13 On December 1, 2016, in the wake of this opinion and the
considerable media attention that followed,14 bipartisan legislators
introduced the Fair Calculations in Civil Damages Act of 2016 to the
114th Congress in an attempt to permanently exclude race, gender, and
other demographic characteristics from consideration when calculating
civil damages in federal courts.15 Beyond the federal system, the bill
also envisioned the issuance of voluntary guidelines by the Department
of Labor and the Department of Justice in an effort to instruct forensic
economists and state court systems on appropriate civil damages
calculation procedures.16 Further, the bill outlined a study and report
component, to be performed by the Judicial Conference of the United
States, detailing damages awards in personal injury cases arising
under federal law that relied on race, gender, or the other identified
demographic characteristics.17 While the bill ultimately died in
committee before the 115th Congress was sworn in (just over a month
after its introduction), the legislative articulation of this sentiment, and
the bipartisan support it received, suggests that the current United
States civil damages system may be due for change.
Part I of this Note provides a background of the traditional uses
of race-based and gendered statistical evidence, including historically
permissible "stereotyping" and recent cases in which it has arisen. Part
II explores the relative merits, constitutionality, and unreliability of
these qualifying categories, particularly when the lines blur and
distinctions between categories become obscured. Part III provides a
discussion of several solutions including a categorical exclusion of all
statistical evidence, as well as the allowance of statistical data to serve
13. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 148-49 (E.D.N.Y.
2015). This decision echoes the sentiment of past decisions by Judge Weinstein. See McMillan v.
City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247 (E.D.N.Y 2008) (refusing to consider the victim's African
American race).
14. See, e.g., Kim Soffen, In One Corner of the Law, Minorities and Women Are Often Valued
Less, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/wonk/
settlements/ [https://perma.cc/9CRM-BSWD]; Ashley Southall, Award in Lead Paint Lawsuit
Can't Be Tied to Ethnicity, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/30/nyregion/award-in-lead-paint-lawsuit-cant-be-tied-to-ethnicity-judge-rules.html?_r=0
[https://perma.ccV3KW-5U4N].
15. See H.R. 6417, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 3489, 114th Cong. (2016). The bill explicitly
prohibited the use of future earnings calculations premised on "race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or
actual or perceived sexual orientation of the plaintiff." H.R. 6417, 114th Cong.; S. 3489, 114th
Cong.; see also Kim Soffen, Congress Could Soon Try to End Racial and Gender Discrimination in
Civil Suits, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/
01/congress-could-soon-try-to-end-racial-and-gender-discrimination-in-civil-suits/?utm term=
.907e241fe712 [https://perma.cc/ABQ4-AEQ4].




a so-called "affirmative action" function. Finally, Section III.C settles
on the proposed solution of prohibiting prima facie race-based and
gendered data and replacing it with demographic factors that are more
accurately tailored to individual plaintiffs, thereby avoiding the
constitutional, social, and applicability concerns associated with their
use.
I. STATISTICAL RELIANCE ON RACE AND GENDER
A. Historically Permissible "Stereotyping"
Although recent judicial and legislative happenings question the
inclusion of certain variables when calculating civil damages,18 the
practice of relying on past data to project future outcomes is regularly
employed in the adversarial system and beyond. 19 The following Section
discusses generally accepted methods of statistical prediction and
provides several examples.
1. An Introduction to Actuarial Science
and the Problem of Redlining
Though distinct from civil damages calculations in the judicial
system, a similar use of data can be found in the actuarial assessments
performed by insurance underwriters.20 As Professor Frederick Schauer
describes, actuaries are simply "specialists in generalization" who
formulate assessments about broad categories of people who share a
selected characteristic, such as age or gender.2 1 Once identified as
possessing the selected characteristic, an individual is then grouped
with others who share that characteristic, and group-wide attributes
are ascribed to each group member.22 However, no direct investigation
occurs to determine whether each group member actually possesses the
group-wide attributes.23 Rather, the group as a whole is "stereotyped."
Based on the profile created by these various group-wide attributes, the
18. See, e.g., G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126; McMillan, 253 F.R.D.
247.
19. See Brams & Rives, supra note 11.
20. See Mary L. Heen, Nondiscrimination in Insurance: The Next Chapter, 49 GA. L. REV. 1,
4 (2014) ("For over a century and a half, individual members of groups historically subjected to
invidious discrimination have been denied access to insurance coverage or paid higher rates (or
received lesser coverage) when classified by race or sex.").
21. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 4 (2003) (using
the example of teenage male drivers in New Jersey paying higher insurance premiums as a result
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underwriter determines the appropriate level of risk to assign the
individual, which in turn affects the decision to insure and the resulting
cost of obtaining an insurance premium.
For example, consider a world where owners of red sports cars
are stereotyped as dangerously fast drivers.24 Once identified as an
"owner of a red sports car," a driver applying for automobile insurance
will be grouped with other red sports car owners, and each group
member will be assigned the group-wide attribute of "dangerously fast
driver." Thus, although this particular driver may consistently drive
ten miles below the speed limit and be the picture of safe driving, his
ownership of a red sports car will necessarily cause the underwriter to
flag him as a "dangerously fast driver," which in turn will increase the
cost of his insurance premium. Mostly, the use of statistical data in this
realm occurs without much protest, and this type of "stereotyping" is
seen as normal practice in the underwriting world.25
However, actuarial assessments that rely on race as the selected
identifying characteristic have faced expected criticism, particularly in
the realm of homeowner's insurance through a practice known as
redlining.26 The term redlining traditionally derives its name from the
government's 1930s practice of figuratively-or in many cases
literally-drawing a red line around certain areas deemed unworthy of
mortgage loans based on the minority racial status of the area's
residents.27 The process was transparent: once an area was identified
as minority-inhabited, insurance providers either imposed higher
insurance premiums or categorically refused to insure homes located
within its bounds.28 Ultimately, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 outlawed
this flamboyantly discriminatory practice.29
However, despite efforts to eradicate this practice, redlining still
appears to be alive and well. 30 Unlike traditional redlining, in which
24. Although an estimated forty-four percent of Americans actually believe that red sports
car owners are subject to higher insurance premiums, insurance providers maintain that car color
does not actually affect their calculus and that the "red car" idea is simply a myth. See Sarah
Whitten, Do Drivers of Red Cars Really Pay More for Auto Insurance?, CNBC (Sept. 21, 2015, 12:01
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/18/do-drivers-of-red-cars-really-pay-more-for-auto-insurance
.html [https://perma.cc/89MK-LMMH].
25. See SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 5 ("[Iln the vast majority of instances the actuarial
behavior of the insurance industry is accepted simply as a fact of life.").
26. Id. at 4-5 & n.2; see Emily Badger, Redlining: Still A Thing, WASH. POST (May 28, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/05/28/evidence-that-banks-still-deny-black
-borrowers-just-as-they-did-50-years-ago/ [https://perma.cclLR5U-5VRU] (describing the
historical roots of redlining).






actuaries unapologetically based their determinations solely on the
racial makeup of a neighborhood, modern redlining is less facially
discriminatory.31 Rather, its discriminatory nature stems from its
definition of risk.32 Depending on the specific type of homeowner's
insurance sought, risk may be defined by the age of the home; a low fair
market value; a likelihood of burglary, vandalism, or other property
damage; and so forth.33 However, these characteristics are
disproportionately found in the lower socioeconomic, high-crime, older
neighborhoods that racial minorities often call home.34 Therefore,
minority individuals are disproportionately affected by the higher risk
level assigned to them by modern redlining techniques, despite the fact
that these lines are no longer technically drawn solely based on race.
While innocuous at first glance, the example of modern redlining
serves as a reminder that "permissible stereotyping" is easily
weaponized. Although this process is no longer inherently race-based,
defining risk in a way that substantially and negatively impacts
minority populations allows insurance providers to perpetuate the
systematic discrimination faced by these groups. Thus, as a consumer
of this sort of statistical evidence, it is crucial to understand how
variables are operationalized.
2. Life Tables, Forensic Economists,
and Lost Earnings Calculations
In cases involving wrongful death or permanent physical injury,
the plaintiff (or the plaintiffs survivors) generally must be compensated
for both present and future damages. Future damages allow the
31. See Matthew Jordan Cochran, Fairness in Disparity: Challenging the Application of
Disparate Impact Theory in Fair Housing Claims Against Insurers, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J.
159, 172 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id. (describing riskier properties as "older homes, structures with low market values, and
properties in dangerous and deteriorating conditions").
34. Gregory D. Squires, Race, Politics, and the Law: Recurring Themes in the Insurance
Redlining Debate, in INSURANCE REDLINING: DISINVESTMENT, REINVESTMENT, AND THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1, 11 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1997) (noting, for example, the
disproportionate number of older homes owned by African Americans). Today's redlining describes
an allegedly race-neutral analysis. See Cochran, supra note 31, at 172; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Am.
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Risk discrimination is not race
discrimination."). Redlining recently came into the public spotlight as a result of the collapse of
the housing market in 2008, which many associate with predatory lending in certain redlined
districts-a process known as "reverse redlining." See Badger, supra note 26 (discussing a
Wisconsin-based bank's two hundred million dollar redlining settlement with the Department of
Housing and Urban Development). In fact, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to
determine whether cities affected by the retail redlining practices of private banks may bring an
action under the Fair Housing Act. See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 136 S. Ct. 2544 (2016).
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plaintiff to recover for foreseeable expenses associated with the
premature diminishment of his or her life, including tangible costs like
future medical expenses and speculative costs like future lost earnings.
Quantifying future damages requires a basic understanding of life
expectancy and worklife expectancy, which life tables readily provide.
Life tables are simply statistical predictions of numerical figures
such as life expectancy or lost worklife, based on past data.35 As
mentioned in the Introduction, life tables index the average number of
years of life remaining for an individual who has reached a given age.36
While race- and gender-neutral tables are certainly available, many
commonly used life tables present this data according to race, gender,
and combinations of race and gender.37
Figure 138
All Races & Origins j - White Black
Age Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
0 78.8 76.4 81.2 79.1 76.7 81.4 75.5 72.3 78.4
1 78.3 75.9 80.6 78.5 76.1 80.7 75.3 72.2 78.2
10 69.4 67.0 71.7 69.6 67.3 71.8 66.5 63.4 69.3
20 59.6 57.3 61.9 59.8 57.5 62.0 56.8 53.7 59.5
30 50.1 48.0 52.1 50.2 48.2 52.3 47.4 44.6 49.8
40 40.7 38.7 42.6 40.8 38.8 42.7 38.2 35.6 40.4
50 31.6 29.7 33.3 31.7 29.9 33.4 29.4 27.0 31.5
60 23.2 21.7 24.6 23.3 21.7 24.6 21.6 19.5 23.3
70 15.6 14.4 16.5 15.6 14.4 16.5 14.8 13.2 15.9
80 9.1 8.3 9.7 9.1 8.3 9.7 9.1 8.0 9.7
90 4.6 4.1 4.8 4.5 4.0 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.2
100 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.3 2.8 2.6 2.8
Life expectancy tables, also known as mortality tables, assist the
jury in determining the plaintiffs future medical expenses and future
pain and suffering. The tables allow jurors to conceptualize how long
the plaintiff will in fact be capable of incurring such expenses, given
35. Lost working life is often simply an easier and more inclusive way to quantify lost wages.
See Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific Economic Data
in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 79 (1994) (noting how the
focus on what the injured plaintiff "could have earned [through work-life], as opposed to what they
would have earned [through lost wages]" allows for compensation to injured plaintiffs who are
homemakers or work in other roles not typically compensated by the traditional market (emphasis
added)). For a further discussion of the potential benefits of relying on lost worklife, see infra
Section II.B.
36. See, e.g., Arias et al., supra note 9, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Figure 1 shows the typical layout of a standard life expectancy table. This table is based
on data excerpted from the U.S. Life Tables. See id.
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their current age.39 From this starting point, certain downward
adjustments may be made based on specific health defects or prior
injuries of the plaintiff.4 0
Worklife tables assist the jury in determining the appropriate
amount of compensation for future lost earning capacity. An
assessment of future lost earnings is simply a comparison of the amount
the injured party was capable of earning preinjury with the amount
that he or she is capable of earning postinjury.41 Beginning with a
worklife expectancy table to establish the period of time left in the
plaintiffs working life, additional information regarding the specific
work history of an injured plaintiff is incorporated to determine the
dollar value of the loss. 4 2
The life tables used in the adversarial setting come from a
number of sources. Most courts permit practitioners to supply their own
tables, although some courts require the mandatory use of state-
codified mortality tables.43 Many practitioners routinely rely on life
tables and worklife tables produced by the federal government. These
include the U.S. Life Tables,44 which are created by the Department of
Health and Human Services, and the Bulletin 2254 Worklife Tables,45
which were created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1984. Notably,
the Bulletin 2254 Worklife Tables have not been updated since their
39. Many practitioners rely on the U.S. Life Tables, which are produced by the federal
government and include different statistical variations based on gender, race, and combinations of
gender and race. See id.
40. This figure, known as the Relative Mortality Ratio, provides a ratio for which to compare
the individual's mortality risk to the mortality risk of the general population. See Robert J.
Thornton & Frank Slesnick, New Estimates of Life Expectancies for Persons with Medical Risks,
10 J. FORENSIC ECON. 285, 285 (1997). Generally, because life tables are not meant to be
conclusive, a plaintiffs preexisting health condition does not affect the admissibility of a life table,
but rather goes towards the weight to be afforded to the evidence. See, e.g., In re Estate of
Eggleston, 698 N.W.2d 892, 897 (2005) ("Where a dispute exists regarding the health of a person
whose life expectancy is in issue, the mortality tables are admissible. . . . But the trier of fact may
or may not use the mortality tables depending on the disposition of the disputed question of fact.").
Although not discussed at length in this Note, an additional factor for consideration would be the
disparate degree to which particular health risks disproportionately affect certain racial minorities
(for example, sickle cell trait in African Americans), thereby decreasing indicated life expectancy.
41. Chamallas, supra note 35, at 79.
42. See id. at 79. This information often includes things like level of educational attainment,
working history, and so forth.
43. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8-46 (West 2016). Notably, the North Carolina Mortality
Table is a race- and gender-neutral life table.
44. See Arias et al., supra note 9.
45. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKLIFE ESTIMATES:
EFFECTS OF RACE AND EDUCATION (1986), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/worklife-estimates/
archive/worklife-estimates-1986.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZZ-KBEY] (relying primarily on data
from 1979-1980 for its estimates); see also Ellison v. United States, No. 09-0331, 2011 WL
13136515, at *26 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2011) (noting the expert's reliance on the BLS worklife tables
as a foundation for his calculation).
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original production in 1984 and rely on data collected prior to 1981.46 In
addition to government-produced tables, many practitioners rely on
existing standardized tables created by highly regarded economists,
such as the Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger worklife tables.47 Others create
and update their own tables using recently available data.48
In some cases, parties introduce life tables directly into evidence
to allow the jurors to draw their own conclusions.49 When submitted
alone, the tables are generally accompanied by jury instructions using
permissive language instructing jurors that they may look to factors
such as age, life expectancy, worklife expectancy, and the like to
compute future damages.50 Further, while jurors are certainly required
to consider the evidence illustrated by the tables, there is no explicit
obligation to incorporate this evidence into their final damages
assessment.51
More commonly, however, life tables instead serve as a
foundation for more advanced calculations by expert witnesses. The
experts testifying in these cases are generally forensic economists or
46. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 45 (describing the
data collection methods). The Bulletin 2254 Worklife Tables are the last set of worklife tables
produced by a United States government agency. See Gary R. Skoog & James E. Ciecka, Evolution
of Worklife Expectancy Measurement, in FORENSIC ECONOMICS: ASSESSING PERSONAL DAMAGES IN
CIVIL LITIGATION 33, 35 (Frank Tiwari ed., 2016).
47. Frank L. Slesnick, Michael R. Luthy & Michael L. Brookshire, A 2012 Survey of Forensic
Economists: Their Methods, Estimates, and Perspectives, 24 J. FORENSIC ECON. 67, 86 (2013)
(discussing the Skoog, Ciecka, and Krueger Tables).
48. See, e.g., David Millimet et al., Estimating Worklife Expectancy: An Econometric
Approach, 113 J. ECONOMETRICS 83 (2003) (introducing a new methodology for creating worklife
tables based on updated data); Daniel L. Millimet et al., Detailed Estimation of Worklife
Expectancy for the Measure of Human Capital: Accounting for Marriage and Children, 24 J. ECON.
SURV. 339 (2010) (relying on the methodology used in the 2003 study to "construct even more
detailed worklife tables based on gender, age, education, race, marital status and parental status,
conditional on current labour force status"). Generally, additional options include relying on the
life-participation employment technique (LPE Model) or choosing a standardized year to end work-
life (such as the time when Social Security benefits kick in). See Michael L. Brookshire & Frank
L. Slesnick, Forensic Economists and Their Changing Viewpoints Over Time, in FORENSIC
ECONOMICS: ASSESSING PERSONAL DAMAGES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 205, 213 (Frank Tiwari ed.,
2016).
49. See, e.g., Kay v. Menard, 754 A.2d 760 (R.I. 2000) (upholding the admissibility of life
tables directly into evidence without explanation by an expert).
50. Statistical evidence in this capacity, and in many, is not provided to conclusively
determine the exact life expectancy or numerical figure, but rather is meant as "an illuminative
guidepost for the jury to reasonably estimate the plaintiffs loss by using statistical variables that
reflect the available objective traits of the plaintiff." Douglas M. Foley, Note, Infants, Lost Earning
Capacity, and Statistics: Sound Methodology or Smoke and Mirrors?, 13 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
827, 841 (1991).
51. See Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 167 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[Life-tables] of this sort
are merely guides to assist a court or jury in arriving at its verdict.'" (citing Gonyer v. Russell,
160 F. Supp. 537, 540 (D.R.I. 1958))).
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vocational rehabilitation specialists.52 Beginning with the time periods
provided by the life tables, experts incorporate additional information
regarding the specific plaintiff into their calculations. Depending on the
level and depth of the qualifying factors used, these figures can paint a
remarkably accurate picture of future damages, thus meeting the
compensatory goal of tort damages.
When determining future lost earnings, the expert's goal is to
calculate the total amount of income foregone as a result of the
plaintiffs diminished earning capacity, discounted back to today's
dollars. 53
WL
PVA, to = [EN,tol I y -it
t=1
In reaching this value, experts generally rely on four basic
elements: (1) anticipated annual base earnings,54 (2) the growth rate of
such earnings,55 (3) the remaining worklife expectancy period,5 6 and (4)
a discount rate.57 Experts provide a more individualized consideration
of the specific working history of the plaintiff, which theoretically
should yield a more accurate anticipated annual base income and
therefore a more accurate result. However, as explored in Part II, the
accuracy of the output may be prejudicially manipulated in a way that
obscures an honest, predictive reading.58
52. See, e.g., G.M.M. exrel. Hernandez-Adamsv. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 131 (E.D.N.Y.
2015) (relying on a forensic rehabilitation expert and two forensic economists); Johnson v.
Montoya, 308 P.3d 566, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (relying on a vocational expert and an economist
expert).
53. The equation explains that the Present Value [PV] of the plaintiffs lost earnings
beginning from the chosen starting age [A] through the end of the worklife [to] is equal to the sum
of the stream of payments available throughout the worklife, based on the annual base earnings
level [EN, to], discounted back to present value by the chosen discount rate , where g
represents the chosen growth rate and i represents the interest rate.
54. The anticipated annual base income is the "actual or projected before-tax income." Childs
v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 1570, 1574 (S.D. Ga. 1996).
55. The growth rate in amount of earnings accounts for extrinsic factors such as inflation, as
well as intrinsic factors such as career progression. See id.
56. Worklife expectancy represents the "probable length of time a person would have
remained in the workforce, taking into account periods of voluntary and involuntary
unemployment." See id.
57. The appropriate discount rate is needed to discount the cash flows back to present value.
See id. The determination of the appropriate discount rate is often hotly contested. For a more
detailed discussion, see William P. Jennings & Penelope Mercurio, Selection of An Appropriate
Discount Rate in Wrongful Death and Personal Injury Cases, 14 J. CONTEMP. L. 195, 200 (1988).
58. See Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1579 ("[B]ecause no one can know what [the infant decedents']
educational and occupational achievement would have been, the experts were at liberty to make
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Ultimately, lost earnings calculations become problematic in
cases where there is no information regarding individualized features
such as educational attainment or career trajectory to help inform the
selection of an anticipated annual base salary.5 9 Where the injured
plaintiff is a young child, these calculations come to resemble mere
guesses, for while child-plaintiffs may certainly recover for lost
earnings, such figures are often "speculative and fraught with
difficulties."60 To solve this problem, experts often include multiple
predictions about future earnings based on several hypothetical
educational attainment outcomes.61 For example, different projections
are made assuming the child attained a high school degree, a bachelor's
degree, a master's degree and so forth.62 However, it is in this realm of
injured children where race-based and gendered data often constitutes
the bulk of the calculation, given the lack of other reliable information.63
Race-specific and gender-specific tables narrow the analysis to
essentially a race-specific and/or gender-specific appraisal.64 Thus, the
lost earnings calculation for an African American male infant may rely
solely on life tables describing African Americans and males, with both
classifications yielding statistically shorter work-lifespans than their
respective Caucasian or female counterparts.65 As such, this practice
caps the range of available damages to these plaintiffs.
assumptions consistent with the interests of the party for which they were testifying."); infra
Section II.A.I.
59. See, e.g., Childs, 923 F. Supp. at 1579 (noting the "illusory" nature of the "mathematical
precision by which all [the] experts" valued the lives of the decedents: a six-year-old child and an
unborn infant).
60. Estevez v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 2d 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Kavanaugh v.
Nussbaum, 514 N.Y.S. 55, 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
61. See Lawrence M. Spizman, Estimating Educational Attainment and Earning Capacity of
a Minor Child, in FORENSIC ECONOMICS: ASSESSING PERSONAL DAMAGES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 75,
75 (Frank Tiwari ed., 2016).
62. Id.
63. See Chamallas, supra note 35, at 82. ("[E]xperts tend most often to resort to gender-based
and race-based statistics when the injured party has only a limited or nonexistent work history.").
64. See Martha Chamallas, Civil Rights in Ordinary Tort Cases: Race, Gender, and the
Calculation of Economic Loss, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1435, 1439 (2005) ("[C]omparing, for example,
women only to other women, blacks to blacks, and men to men.").
65. See infra Fig.2 (noting an African American male aged zero to one has a life expectancy
of 71.1 years, as opposed to the gender-neutral and race-neutral calculation of 78.5 years; the race-
neutral male calculation of 76.0 years; the African American gender-neutral calculation of 74.5
years; and the African American female calculation of 77.6 years).
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B. Recent Rejections of Raced-Based and Gendered Evidence at Trial:
Selected Examples
1. Judge Weinstein's Initial Rejection: The McMillan Rule
In McMillan v. City of New York, the plaintiff, an African
American male, suffered a severe spinal cord injury following a
ferryboat crash.66 In determining the plaintiffs future damages, the
defendant's expert attempted to rely on data showing that African
Americans who suffer from spinal cord injuries tend to have shorter
lifespans than "other 'races'" suffering from similar injuries.67
Summarily rejecting the use of race-based life expectancies, Judge
Weinstein supported his position with a thorough analysis of the
"factual unreliability" of race-based data and the equal protection and
due process violations inherent in their use.
As an initial matter, Judge Weinstein examined the extensive
body of social and anthropological scholarship that considers race to be
a simple "biological fiction." 68 Focusing on the lack of genetic variation
between different racial groups, Judge Weinstein instead posited that
"race" is simply a social construct that has little, if anything, to do with
biological variance.69 Thus, according to this argument, race alone
cannot inherently predict life expectancy. Moreover, Judge Weinstein
examined the unreliability of rigidly defined racial categories, a topic
explored in depth in Part II.70 Next, he considered the incomplete
picture provided by focusing on race alone, suggesting that other factors
may be to blame for the apparent life expectancy gap between certain
races.71 Finally, noting the distinct lack of previous constitutional
challenges, Judge Weinstein briefly discussed the constitutional
problems associated with relying on race-based ata at trial, discussed
further in Part 11.72
2. Criminal Restitution: United States v. Bedonie
The need to quantify life expectancy and lost earnings exists
outside of civil damages. Similar calculations are often necessary when
determining restitution in criminal cases involving victims who suffer
66. 253 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.N.Y 2008).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 249-50. To punctuate his point that race is in fact a fictional concept, all references
to race and racial categories throughout the opinion are set off by quotation marks. See id.
69. Id. at 250.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See infra Part II.
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severe personal injury or death. In United States v. Bedonie, a federal
district court awarded full restitution under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act in two consolidated homicide cases.73 Over the
objections of the defendants and the government, the court appointed
an expert to determine the lost earnings of the victims: a twenty-two-
year-old Native American male and a three-month-old Native American
female.74 Upon noticing the expert's initial reports were calculated
based on the victims' Native American race and respective genders, the
court became "concerned about possible constitutional and other
problems in relying on race and sex assumptions."75 However, the court
chose to avoid "reaching constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them" when it instructed the court-appointed
expert to recalculate restitution using race- and gender-neutral data.76
The court instead relied on its discretion, claiming that:
As a matter of fairness, the court should exercise its discretion in favor of victims of violent
crime and against the possible perpetuation of inappropriate stereotypes . . . . This is
particularly true in this case, where the defendants have deprived their victims of the
chance to excel in life beyond predicted statistical averages.7 7
Rather, the court placed the burden on the defendants to prove that
race and gender were necessary components of the calculation.78
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to exclude race and gender, finding
no abuse of discretion.79 Noting that while 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) imposes
the burden of proving loss on the government, the statute also allows
matters to be shifted to "the party designated by the court as justice
requires."80 Thus, the district court did not err in its decision to place
73. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1293 (D. Utah 2004), rev'd on other grounds and remanded sub nom
United States v. Serawop, 410 F.3d 656 (10th Cir. 2005).
74. Id. at 1290.
75. Id. at 1314. In an sad twist of events, the defendant also attempted to discount his
daughter's future earning capacity by relying on the fact that "she resided in a household where
he was abusive." Id. at 1322. He claimed that given his history of domestic violence, the chance
that his daughter would go on to graduate from high school was much lower, and therefore this
personalized factor should be accounted for when calculating restitution. Id. The court squarely
rejected the defendant's attempt "to creative [sic] an abusive family situation and then argue that,
because of this abuse, his daughter was less likely to succeed in a life." Id. This provides an
interesting example of a defendant attempting to reduce an award based on the plaintiffs
socioeconomic status.




79. United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007).
80. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (2012)).
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the burden on the defendant to prove that race-based and gendered
statistics were necessary aspects of the restitution calculation.81
3. Criminal Sentencing: Buck v. Davis
Even beyond life expectancy and lost earnings calculations, race-
based evidence often finds its way to trial. Recently, it found its way to
the Supreme Court. In Buck v. Davis, the defendant, an African
American male, was convicted of capital murder.82 At the sentencing
phase of his trial, state law instructed that the jury was entitled to
sentence the defendant to death "only if it found unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant was likely to commit
future acts of violence.83 The defense counsel called a court-appointed
psychologist to testify regarding the issue.
In determining the defendant's likelihood of recidivism, the
expert "considered seven 'statistical factors,' " including the defendant's
African American race.84 In a written report (which was subsequently
admitted into evidence), the expert wrote: "Black: increased probability.
There is an overrepresentation of Blacks among the violent offenders."85
Further, when testifying, the expert claimed that race was among
"certain factors . . . 'know[n] to predict future dangerousness.' "86
Although the expert ultimately concluded that the defendant did not
pose a future danger of reoffending, the damage was done.87 The
defendant was sentenced to death.88
In light of the defense counsel's prior knowledge of the expert's
reliance on race, the Supreme Court held that the decision to elicit
specific testimony regarding the defendant's race constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.89 Further, the district court's denial of the
defendant's Rule 60(b)(6) motion based on its finding that race played
only a de minimis role in sentencing was an abuse of discretion.90
While Buck v. Davis is clearly confined to the solemnest of
situations where an expert's testimony "expressly makes a defendant's
race pertinent on the question of life or death," many of the same
rationales for excluding race-based expert testimony apply to civil
81. See id.




86. Id. at 769.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 780.
90. Id.
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damages.91 In writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts describes
the "perfect storm" created when an expert introduces evidence that
coincides with existing racial prejudice.92 Clearly this harm is not
limited to the criminal context. Similar to the "particularly noxious
strain of racial prejudice" that leads people to believe African American
men are prone to violence, some jurors may believe that minorities or
women are inherently worthy of earning less. Thus, having an expert
speak to this exact issue at trial may validate their existing
discriminatory prejudices. Further, the immutable character of race
certainly applies equally in the civil setting.93 In writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts makes much ado of the fact that "one
thing would never change: the color of [the defendant's] skin." Similarly,
an injured plaintiff is unable to change his or her skin color to escape
racial stereotypes that may prevent adequate recovery.
C. The Special Circumstances of Lead Paint Cases: A Case Study
1. The Historical Use and Dangers of Lead-Based Paint
The use of race-based statistics in the commonly known "lead
paint cases" presents a particular problem given the disproportionate
number of minority children serving as injured plaintiffs.94 In 1978, the
federal government banned the sale of lead-based paint for commercial
uses.95 However, according to the Environmental Protection Agency,
lead poisoning remains the number one environmental health threat to
children in the United States ages six and younger.96 Young children
are particularly susceptible to the negative effects of lead exposure due
to their developmentally fragile state and proclivity for hand-to-mouth
contact.97
91. Id. at 777.
92. Id. at 769. Admittedly, the "storm" Chief Justice Roberts was referring to was exacerbated
in this case by the fact that the evidence was introduced by a court-appointed expert. Id. at 777.
93. Id. at 776. ("But one thing would never change: the color of [the defendant's] skin. [The
defendant] would always be black.").
94. See Laura Greenberg, Comment, Compensating the Lead Poisoned Child: Proposals for
Mitigating Discriminatory Damage Awards, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 429, 430 (2001).
95. See CPSC Announces Final Ban on Lead-Containing Paint, U.S. CONSUMER PROD.
SAFETY COMM'N (Sept. 2, 1977), http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/1977/CPSC-Announces-Final-Ban
-On-Lead-Containing-Paint/ [perma.cc/B6HT-D92T].
96. See Press Release, Donna Heron, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Lead Poisoning: Number One
Environmental Health Threat to Children Ages Six and Younger in the U.S., https://archive.epa
.gov/epapages/newsroom archive/newsreleases/5e312cbe6666dca8852579340068ebef.html
[https://perma.cc/W6T5-J89B].




Unfortunately, the low-income housing often associated with
minority populations tends to have a disproportionate amount of lead-
based paint hazards, given the lack of improvements to these
deteriorating structures and the unavailability of funding for updating
purposes.98 Older lead-based paint is often simply painted over as a way
of avoiding the extensive removal costs.99 However, when the substance
is not completely removed, the risk remains and becomes especially
pervasive once the top level of paint is disturbed. Because the residents
of these lead-infested buildings are often racial minorities, evidence at
trial regarding the statistically shorter lifespan of minority populations
is especially damaging. Further, because these injured plaintiffs are
children, this race-centric data often takes center stage and becomes
outcome-determinative.100 Thus, the compounding of race with age
leads to a particularly helpless situation for these young plaintiffs.
Ultimately, some scholars suggest that situations like these
create perverse incentives for tortfeasors.101 Because the cost of injuring
these populations is reduced, potential tortfeasors may be less cautious
when dealing with them. For example, consider a landlord who owns
two residential buildings: one whose residents are all Caucasian males
and one whose residents are all Hispanic females. If lead-based paint is
found and the landlord is sued, the residents in the Caucasian male
building will cost the landlord much more in damages than the
residents in the Hispanic female building. Thus, if given the
opportunity to choose between protecting the two groups, the rational
self-serving landlord will exercise greater care to prevent harms to the
Caucasian males than to the Hispanic females.
98. David E. Jacobs et. al., The Prevalence of Lead-Based Paint Hazards in U.S. Housing, 110
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A599, A606 (2002) (finding that thirty-five percent of low-income housing
within the United States contained lead-based paint hazards).
99. Id. at A599 ("Unless proper precautions are implemented, lead-based paint can
contaminate dust or soil when it ... is disturbed during maintenance, repainting, remodeling,
demolition, or paint removal.").
100. See supra Section I.A.2.
101. See Chamallas, supra note 64, at 1441 ("[Bjecause it is cheaper to injure poor minority
children, there is less incentive for defendants to take measures to clean up toxic hazards in the
neighborhoods most affected by lead paint."). For additional examples of the perverse incentives
created by race-based damages, see Ronen Avraham, Torts and Discrimination, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017).
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2. Judge Weinstein on Lead-Based Paint:
G.MM ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson.
In a recent lead paint case in the Eastern District of New York,
Judge Weinstein reiterated the fact that "[b]ecause low-income and
minority families are more likely to occupy older homes with lead-based
paint, the majority of children poisoned by lead in the United States are
poor African-American and Latino children." 102 Although noting the
OMB's practice of distinguishing between race and ethnicity, for
purposes of his analysis, Judge Weinstein treated ethnicity-based data
as largely similar to race-based data. 103
In G.MM ex rel Hernandez-Adams, the infant-plaintiff was a
young Hispanic male who was exposed to lead-based paint in his
Brooklyn apartment when the family dog scratched the apartment
walls and released the toxins.1 0 4 After finding the defendant-landlord
liable, the determination of damages focused on the typical lost earning
capacity question: "what the child would have become without the
injury."105 To assist the jury in this determination, the plaintiff and the
defendant presented their respective experts, who each relied on the
child's Hispanic ethnic classification in their calculations.
The plaintiffs expert relied mostly on the educational and
vocational attainment of the child's parents; he premised his opinion on
the idea that:
[We see children achieving higher levels of education, educational achievement, than
their parents as a generality. And it is particularly true in Hispanic families....
[Hispanics] came from backgrounds, many of them, without substantial educational
histories.... So ... within the Hispanic population there is even a more pronounced
tendency for their children to have higher levels of educational achievement han their
parents.106
Thus, classification as Hispanic boded well for this young boy, given
that his mother held a master's degree and his father held a bachelor's
degree.107 If this expert's projections were taken to pass, then at least
master's degree-level compensation (and potentially even doctorate
degree-level compensation) would be required.108 Thus, the plaintiffs
102. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
103 Id. at 148 ("Ethnicity, like race, as discussed in McMillan, is a fictitious, changing, and
unreliable social construct); see also id. at 152 ("The use of race-based statistics to obtain a reduced
damages award-which is now extended to the use of ethnicity-based statistics, to calculate future
economic loss-is unconstitutional.").
104. Id. at 131.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 132.




expert relied on ethnic stereotyping to increase the amount of damages
receivable, a concept explored in depth in Section III.B. 109
The plaintiffs expert also relied substantially on the parent's
socioeconomic standing, a metric complexly related to race and
ethnicity.110 While the expert claimed that ethnicity played a minimal
role in his calculation, it is important to note that many of the factors
used were themselves related to race and ethnicity, including
socioeconomic status, projected educational attainment, worklife
expectancy, and so forth. Ultimately, the plaintiffs expert projected an
economic loss of approximately $2.5 million to $4 million."
On the other hand, the defendant's forensic economist used
ethnicity to decrease the amount of damages, focusing instead on the
general earning capacity of Hispanic males. His calculations relied on
"Hispanic males' education statistics" and "Hispanic males' academic
achievements" to arrive at a significantly smaller award than the
plaintiffs expert.112 He approximated an economic loss of $1.3 million
to $2.5 million. 113
Addressing both experts, Judge Weinstein determined that any
predictions about the infant's future earning capacity must be
calculated completely devoid of his Hispanic ethnicity.114 Relying
heavily on his previous exclusion of race-based statistics in McMillan v.
City of New York, Judge Weinstein again noted the concept of race as a
biological fiction, the unreliability of definitive racial categories, the
intricate connection between socioeconomic status and race, and finally
the unconstitutionality associated with using race as a means to
decrease damages.115
109. See infra Section II.B.
110. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams, 116 F. Supp. 3d at 132-33 (describing the cross
examination of the plaintiffs expert); see infra Section ILA.
111. Id. at 134-35.
112. Id. at 135.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 134 (noting Judge Weinstein's comment that "Hispanics is too general a
category.... You'll have to be more definitive with respect to this particular family. We have
professors as well as gardeners who are Hispanics, and I don't believe that we ought to go forward
in federal court with that assumption of uniformity.").
115. Id. at 134-35. For a further discussion of Judge Weinstein's constitutional analysis, see
infra Part II.
1372 [Vol. 70:4:1353
FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH
II. PROBLEMS WITH STATISTICAL DAMAGES
A. The Impracticality of Current Statistical Metrics:
Applicability Concerns
1. The Reference Class Problem and Overfitting
The reference class problem refers to the inherent aspect of user-
selection involved when making statistical inferences.116 Because
statistical inference requires "abstracting a person (or event or thing)
to a few salient characteristics, and then comparing that person with
others having the same or similar characteristics," the characteristics
that we choose to focus on when describing that person (or event or
thing) will definitively determine the scope of the resulting inferences.
Thus, because there are often countless ways to describe a single thing,
the predictive worth of any inference relies upon the chosen frame of
reference.117
For example, consider the commonly cited statistic that heart
disease is the leading cause of death, accounting for approximately one
out of every four deaths annually." This statistic does not apply evenly
to all populations.119 Instead, studies how that the risk of contracting
heart disease is highly correlated with factors such as age, race and
ethnicity, geography, family history, and existing medical conditions.120
For instance, in reality, only 18.4% of American Indian deaths are
attributable to heart disease, as compared to 23.8% of non-Hispanic
Whites.121 Additionally, individuals living in the southeastern United
States are disproportionately susceptible to death by heart disease
when compared to their fellow citizens in the northwestern United
States.122 Thus, the type of statistical inputs used to reach this idea of
"one out of every four deaths" is crucial. Presumably, that reference
class meant to capture the blended average of all races and geographical
locations. However, when the reference class is concentrated on a
particular subpopulation, such as American Indian males or American
Indian males living in the northwestern United States, the outcome is
substantially different.
116. See Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 2081, 2085 (2009).
117. Id.








Ultimately, statistical inference is very much the result of
choice.123 The decision to include or exclude certain inputs can have
remarkable effects on the output, and therefore, the predictive value of
the calculation.124 Practitioners and their experts are often able to
obscure values in favor of their clients by relying on certain variables to
create desirable outcomes.125 These differential inputs and the results
they produce often set the stage for a "battle of the experts" at trial, and
the nonexpert jury is left to make an assessment that scholars and
experts continue to debate: what is the correct reference class?
For example, in G.M.M. ex rel Hernandez-Adams, the experts'
respective judgments as to the young boy's future lost earnings were
the clear result of choice.126 The plaintiffs expert focused on the
"educational and vocational accomplishments of parents and adults
who are around a child during that developmental process."127 Because
the child's mother held a master's degree, the child's father held a
bachelor's degree, and both individuals were gainfully employed in well-
paying jobs, the use of these factors painted a positive picture of the
child's future lost earnings. Further, the expert redirected the child's
Hispanic race (which on average results in lesser educational
attainment) to claim, "within the Hispanic population there is even a
more pronounced tendency for their children to have higher levels of
educational achievement than their parents."128 In terms of reference
class, the plaintiffs expert applied a more individualized class,
incorporating several different variables. Instead of focusing on
sweeping generalizations about Hispanic males, the expert attempted
to probe at characteristics more unique to the child.
The defense, on the other hand, focused much more generally on
the traditional educational attainment of Hispanic males, suggesting
that only 2.1% of Hispanic males held a master's degree or better.129
The exclusion of the parents' educational and occupational attainment
123. See Frank D. Tinari, An Introduction to the Field of Forensic Economics, in FORENSIC
ECONOMICS: ASSESSING PERSONAL DAMAGES IN CIVIL LITIGATION 1, 5 (Frank Tiwari ed., 2016).
("[I]t must be reiterated that the forensic economics methodology, though not complicated, requires
consideration of numerous elements of each particular case. Choices must be made by the analyst
at nearly every turn.").
124. See Cheng, supra note 116, at 2085.
125. See Edward K. Cheng, Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 92, 93 (2009) ("As long as counsel manipulates the reference class sufficiently, he
can arrive at any ... number he wants.").
126. See G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 132 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
127. Id. at 131.
128. Id. at 132.
129. See id. at 135 (citing the National Center for Education Statistics).
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substantially lowered the amount of damages available. Similarly, the
inclusion of the child within the broad class of Hispanic males further
decreased the figure.
Ultimately, the reference class problem becomes particularly
tricky when too many variables are incorporated into the calculation. 130
In those instances, what may seem like a very accurate model (given a
high coefficient of determination) may actually be inaccurate. Instead,
the fit may simply be due to statistical noise resulting from a
superfluous number of included attributes.131
For example, consider John from the Introduction.1 32 If the
plaintiffs expert were to make statistical predictions based solely off of
John's status as an African American, then this number would likely
lack an accurate depiction of his actual earning potential. However,
attempting to include every single available reference point (his race,
gender, parents' educational attainment, parents' marital status,
parents' income, number of siblings, geographical location, etc.) may
potentially result in a high degree of statistical noise and an equally
inaccurate depiction. This type of overfitting permits experts to use
complicated calculations as a smoke screen to obscure the actual
process behind arriving at their final figure-a figure that is actually
just the result of statistical noise. Thus, it is important that when
choosing a reference class, the expert does not overfit the data by
including too many variables.133
Statistical evidence is subject to a great deal of manipulation,
particularly in areas like damages calculations where a broad universe
of possible variables and reference classes exist. While the inclusion of
too few variables will result in low accuracy, the inclusion of too many
variables will "overfit" the data- both resulting in a lack of predictive
worth. 134
2. Blurred Lines: Mixed Race and Transgendered Individuals
The inclusion of race-based and gendered qualifiers becomes
particularly hazy in instances where categories mix and rigid lines are
impossible to draw. Given the increased prevalence of interracial
130. See Cheng, supra note 116, at 2095 ("[I]f the court uses characteristics that are too
narrow, then it will run the risk of incorporating noise and random coincidence.").
131. Id. at 2093 ("Too complex a model will incorporate too much random noise into its
inferences about future observations and will ... be inaccurate.").
132. See supra Introduction.
133. Cheng, supra note 116, at 2092-93.
134. See id. at 2093 ("Too simple a model will fail to identify the underlying relationship and
have low predictive accuracy. Too complex a model will incorporate too much random noise into
its inferences about future observations and will also be inaccurate.").
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relationships and complex gender identities beyond the classic male-
female divide, an entirely new problem is erupting for traditional race-
based and gendered statistical evidence.135 The current regime, based
solely on binary gender options and the seven major racial categories,136
does not appear equipped to handle the challenges posed by a new
generation of multiracial and genderqueer individuals. 137
The issue has already arisen in relatively simple cases involving
biracial plaintiffs. For example, in Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States,
a jury faced the predicament of calculating damages for an injured
biracial infant.138 Because the young boy's mother was Caucasian and
his father was African American, the court confronted the question of
which of these categories to assign when presenting worklife tables.139
The court was forced to decide: should the boy be considered Caucasian
(like his mother) or African American (like his father) for the purposes
of these statistical predictions? In rejecting the defendant's argument
that the "average black male" statistic was the appropriate measure,
the court held that it would be "inappropriate to incorporate current
discrimination resulting in wage differences between the sexes or aces
or the potential for any future such discrimination into a calculation for
damages resulting from lost wages."140 Instead, the court chose the
"average wage[] for all persons," relying on a blended average of all
racial categories and both traditional genders. 141
In application, it should be noted that the court's decision to
incorporate the average female wage by relying on the blended average
actually reduced the value below the defendant's proposed value, which
135. See Lise Funderburg, The Changing Face of America, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 2013),
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2013/10/changing-faces/funderburg-text [https://perma.cc/
8MFK-P4X8] (discussing the new racial environment of the United States and the need to
reconsider existing notions of race and identity). The article discusses the United States' Census
Bureau's inclusion of a multiracial category in the 2000 census, at which point 6.8 million
Americans identified as multiracial. Id. In the 2010 census, that figure rose by thirty-two percent.
Id. However, given that respondents are able to select more than one category when self-reporting
their race, Census data on race is remarkably complicated.
136. The 2010 census listed the seven major racial classifications: White, Black or African
American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander,
and Some Other Race. See 2010 Census Demographic Profile Summary File, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
6-3 to 6-4 (Aug. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/doc/dpsf.pdf [https://perma.cc8EMA-
D9H8].
137. The term genderqueer serves as an inclusive term for transgendered and gender-variant
individuals. See Pauline Park, GenderPAC, the Transgender Rights Movement and the Perils of a
Post-Identity Politics Paradigm, 4 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 747, 754 (2003).
138. Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 454 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub nom.
Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
139. Id. at 455.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 456.
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relied on data based on African American males.142 Using a calculation
devoid of all qualifying factors impacted the injured party's recovery in
a counterintuitive way. Much of the negative visceral reaction to race-
based and gendered statistical evidence stems from the idea that
minorities and women will always be negatively impacted, whereas
Caucasians and males will always be made better off. However, as
Wheeler Tarpeh-Doh illustrates, the exclusion of certain race- or gender-
based figures can become something of a give-and-take battle. While
the inclusion of the all-race metric increased the amount of potential
damages, the simultaneous inclusion of the all-gender metric brought
the figure crashing back down.143
Assuming that race-based and gendered statistical predictions
are in fact permitted, one option to address the difficulty in classifying
multiracial individuals would be simply to create new categories with
respect to the individual's unique racial makeup. For example, the
solution in Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe would be to place the plaintiff in the
statistical class of other biracial males sharing similar racial
backgrounds-in this case Caucasian and African American parents.144
While this option may currently be feasible for certain individuals based
on similar racially identified populations, the difficulty quickly
compounds in a situation involving the multiracial child of two biracial
parents. For example, if the child's mother is of African American and
Caucasian descent, and the child's father is of American Indian and
Asian descent, in what group should that child fall? For consistency, the
child should similarly be compared to individuals with his or her same
racial makeup. Therefore, the appropriate comparator is persons with
a similarly mixed racial background of African American, White,
American Indian, and Asian descent.
However, finding reliable data on a class of individuals sharing
this unique makeup may be a difficult task at this point. More time may
be needed for a large enough class of individuals to produce meaningful
data on life expectancy, worklife expectancy, salary, and so forth for
these predictions to be useful. Further, even if enough data were
produced for one class of multiracial individuals, at some point
attempting to classify an individual based on their distinct racial
makeup may become an impossibly convoluted endeavor.145 This idea
echoes the reference class problem mentioned above: theoretically, the
142. See id. ("The average wages for all persons are lower than the average black male wages;




145. See Funderburg, supra note 135, and text accompanying note 135.
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class could eventually become so narrow that it becomes entirely unique
and no workable inferences could be drawn. 146
Continuing to assume that race-based and gendered statistics
are accepted, another option would be to simply consider the existing
statistical predictions for each major race making up the individual's
racial identity and combine these figures for a mean average. However,
how much of one race would be statistically significant in the makeup
of a multiracial individual? Much like the blood quantum laws for
Native Americans or the "one drop rule" for African Americans, would
the injured party need to definitively prove that he or she is in fact a
descendant of the proposed race?147 Further, as with any mean average,
outliers may seriously obscure the validity of the output. Finally, as a
practical matter, presenting such reasoning in court may prove
challenging; explaining these methods may simply confuse the jury.
A similar difficulty occurs when applying gendered statistics to
the genderqueer community. While the current gender system accounts
for a dichotomous choice, many consider gender to be much more
fluid. 148 For example, should a postoperative male-to-female
transgendered individual be treated differently from a male-to-female
transgendered individual in the earliest stages of transition? Further,
should the individual be classified according to her original anatomical
sex of male, or rather the gender with which she identifies?
Much like the solution in situations involving multiracial
individuals, it is presumably possible that new categories of gender
could be created and accounted for as needed. However, such data
would likely take years to amass. And similar to the evolved
understanding of multiracial individuals, there appears to be a growing
recognition of gender fluidity. 149 This suggests that whatever figures
were created may require continual revision to account for new
146. See supra Section II.A.
147. See Craig J. Dorsay, Blood Quantum Issues and Other Challenges for Tribal Attorneys
and Their Clients, in BEST PRACTICES FOR DEFENDING TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP CASES 55 (2013), 2013
WL 5293044 (discussing the practical problems associated with enforcing blood quantum laws);
Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans,
and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1187 (1997) (discussing the formal adoption of the
one-drop rule by the U.S. Census in 1920).
148. See Katy Steinmetz, Beyond 'He'or 'She' The Changing Meaning of Gender and Sexuality,
TIME, Mar. 27, 2017, at 50.
149. See e.g., Emma Green, Does Adding 'Genderqueer' to the Dictionary Make it 'Real'?,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2016/04/
genderqueer-cisgender-transphobia-merriam-webster/479406/ [https://perma.cc/3ZSH-SDKX]
(noting the addition by Merriam-Webster of several terms relating to sexuality and gender identity
to its dictionaries); Ruth Padawer, What's So Bad About A Boy Who Wants To Wear A Dress?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/magazine/whats-so-bad-about-a-boy-
who-wants-to-wear-a-dress.html [https://perma.cc/HTX2-Q83J].
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variations. Further, the sensitive and personal nature of gender
identification suggests that perhaps. rigidly operationalizing it as a
variable is neither appropriate nor accurately possible.
Even if data on transgendered persons could be produced to
accurately predict he intended values for the intended individuals, one
of the most basic problems remains: the perpetuation of systematic
discrimination. The transgendered community perhaps serves as one of
the best illustrations of statistically determined damages preserving
the disadvantaged status of a population. Transgendered individuals
suffer from a long history of discrimination in a wide variety of aspects
of their lives, ranging from employment and housing to criminal
justice.15 0 As a result of this stigmatization, transgendered individuals
tend to face disproportionately high rates of unemployment and
homelessness.15 1 Thus, including a gender-based predictor that
reflected this victimized status may only perpetuate the historically
poor treatment of society's most neglected victims.
However, in spite of the magnified problems that occur when
traditional race and gender categories blur, the merits of statistical
evidence should not be completely discarded. After all, there is
undeniable relief in the objectivity inherent to statistical predictions
that make them so attractive in making sense of particularly blurry
areas.
B. The Elephant in the Room: Constitutional Concerns
Though relatively unchallenged in the judicial system thus far,
the constitutional questions surrounding the use of race-based and
gendered statistics typically arise in the context of equal protection and
due process.152 As a threshold matter, only those race-based and
gendered classifications that constitute state action can validly support
challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment.153 Recognizing the high
bar required to prove such violations, this Note presents Judge
150. See Jaime Johnson, Recognition of the Nonhuman: The Psychological Minefield of
Transgender Inequality in the Law, 34 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 153, 154 (2010) (mentioning primary
areas of discrimination as "employment, family law, healthcare, criminal justice, housing, and
immigration").
151. Id. at 162 (discussing the pervasive legal and judicial inaction in response to the legal
and social problems faced by the transgendered community).
152. Notably, a review of the literature and case law suggests a normative acceptance of race-
based statistics as constitutionally sound.
153. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action of a particular character




Weinstein's possible arguments for asserting a race-based challenge.154
In producing these arguments, Judge Weinstein relied substantially on
the scholarship of Professor Martha Chamallas, which is also presented
below.
According to Judge Weinstein, the argument for a violation of
equal protection proceeds as follows. It is a well-established tenet of
constitutional law that the classification of individuals on the basis of
race creates a suspect category.155 Beginning with its original
articulation in Korematsu v. United States, the Supreme Court has long
held that explicit racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny.156 Under
strict scrutiny, racial classifications will be upheld as constitutional
"only if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling government
interests."15 7
Applied to civil damages, a judge's decision to allow race-based
economic evidence to be introduced at trial can be interpreted as judicial
reliance, thereby constituting state action and triggering strict
scrutiny.158 While normally the judge's decision to admit evidence does
not offer insight into his or her personal opinions of the evidence, race-
based economic data is unique. For example, the decision to admit
eyewitness testimony does not inherently indicate that the judge
believes the eyewitness is reliable.159 On the other hand, the decision to
admit race-based evidence "conced[es] the relevance" of racial
considerations. Therefore, the judge's admission constitutes state
action by allowing the jury to believe that reliance on race-based
considerations is legally appropriate, thereby establishing "a common
law rule that the future earning capacity of the plaintiff depends upon"
race.160 Thus, subjecting the plaintiff to a decreased life expectancy on
the basis of his or her race violates equal protection.161
Several problems arise when attempting to bring an equal
protection challenge under this line of reasoning. Despite creative
154. While this discussion focuses on race-based data, it should be noted that challenges based
on gendered statistics face an even higher hurdle. Because classifications based on gender simply
trigger intermediate scrutiny, the action need only be "substantially related to an important
government objective." Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
155. McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 255 (E.D.N.Y 2008) (citing United States
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
156. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted that ... all legal restrictions which curtail
the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. . . . Pressing public necessity may
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.").
157. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
158. McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 255 (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614,
620-28 (1991); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1948)).
159. See Chamallas, supra note 35, at 106.
160. Id.
161. McMillan, 253 F.R.D. at 255.
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arguments by Judge Weinstein and Professor Chamallas, it is not
explicitly clear that the type of judicial reliance described constitutes
state action. In supporting their argument, both Judge Weinstein and
Professor Chamallas rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson
v. Leesville Concrete Company, which held that race-based preemptory
challenges exercised by private litigants during a civil trial constituted
state action. 162 However, preemptory challenges and economic evidence
are readily distinguishable as a matter of state of action. As an initial
consideration, preemptory challenges have "no utility outside of the jury
system, a system which the government alone administers."1 63 On the
other hand, economic evidence can be used in a number of settings
beyond trial, including during settlement negotiations in which the
government has no role.164 Further, even at trial, the government
cannot explicitly exercise control over experts' findings beyond
qualifying experts and admitting their testimony.
Additionally, in terms of impact, decisions made during voir dire
necessarily infect the entirety of the trial by choosing who gets to
participate as a trier of fact. Thus, preemptory challenges directly affect
the outcome of the trial. However, race-based data is simply evidence to
be considered by those chosen triers of fact; jurors are not explicitly
obligated to rely on this evidence. As such, it seems the possible effects
of discrimination during voir dire far exceed the possible effects of
discrimination during the presentation of evidence. As a final practical
consideration, Edmonson explicitly holds that it is the excluded jurors
whose equal protection rights are violated by this state action.165
However, in the realm of civil damages, it is presumably the plaintiff
who seeks to prove that the inclusion of race-based considerations
violates his or her own equal protection rights.
Regarding due process concerns, Judge Weinstein explains the
existence of "a right-in effect a property right-to compensation" of an
injured party under state and federal law.166 Because substantive law
restricts the form and content of expert evidence offered at trial, the
court's admission of race-based evidence creates arbitrary and
irrational state action.167 Thus where a court permits "ill-founded
assumption[s]" to be included at trial, this action arbitrarily "burden[s]
162. 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
163. Id. at 622.
164. Chamallas, supra note 35, at 107.
165. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 614 ("Race-based exclusion of potential jurors in a civil case
violates the excluded persons' equal protection rights.").




on 'racial' grounds a class of litigants who seek compensation," thereby
constituting a denial of due process.168
Although distinct from civil damages, the Supreme Court
recently found that such "ill-founded assumptions" are to be treated
with particular care when considering due process in the criminal
setting.169 In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, a jury convicted the
petitioner of harassment and unlawful sexual contact.170 After the
verdict was rendered, two jurors informed the petitioner's counsel of
several derogatory statements made by another juror during
deliberations regarding the petitioner's Hispanic ethnicity.171
Specifically, that juror repeatedly contended that "Mexican men" were
physically controlling and abusive towards women and, therefore, that
the petitioner was guilty. 17 2 Further, because the juror considered the
petitioner's alibi witness to be "an illegal," he discounted the alibi
testimony as untruthful.173 Upon reporting this information to the
court, the petitioner's counsel memorialized the reporting witnesses'
statements in written affidavits.174
Denying the petitioner's motion for a new trial based on this
information, the trial court noted the juror's bias but held that Colorado
Rule of Evidence 606(b) summarily prohibited the presentation of any
evidence pertaining to matters or statements that occurred during jury
deliberations in a proceeding questioning the validity of the verdict.175
On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's decision, relying on precedent suggesting
that the jury's right to confidential deliberations is paramount to the
effective administration of justice.176
The United States Supreme Court reversed.177 In piercing the
impressive shield provided by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) and
related state evidentiary rules, the Supreme Court held that "where a
juror makes a clear statement hat indicates he or she relied on racial
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Sixth
168. Id. at 256.
169. 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
170. Id. at 861.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 862.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) is substantially similar to Federal Rule of Evidence
606(b). Compare COLO. R. EVID. 606(b) ("Inquiring into validity of verdict or indictment."), with
FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (During an Inquiry into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment . . .
176. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
177. Id. at 869.
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Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way. . . ."178
Distinguishing racial bias from other possible forms of juror bias,
including substance abuse179 and prodefendant bias,180 the Court found
that "[a] constitutional rule that racial bias in the justice system must
be addressed-including, in some instances, after a verdict has been
entered-is necessary to prevent a systemic loss of confidence in jury
verdicts.. ."181 In so ruling, the Court affirmed its dedication to rooting
out racial bias, going so far as to reach into jury deliberations to be sure
that it is avoided.
C. The Dangers of Stereotyping
Although questionably sound under existing constitutional
doctrine, some may still find the practice normatively objectionable and
hold the view, much like the one espoused by Judge Weinstein, that
using innate physical characteristics such as race and gender is simply
unacceptable. As constitutional and evidence law scholar Frederick
Schauer notes,
When we examine the principle of treating like cases alike, we perceive an immediate
difficulty, not because it is a bad thing ... but because the principle ... appears to be so
vacuous as to be incapable of supporting the idea of equality, or indeed of supporting much
of anything else.1 8 2
Making generalizations about groups of people in this manner goes
against the individualistic values that drive Western society. Further,
life tables are inherently retroactive; that is, they base their statistical
prediction off of past patterns. Thus, relying on such information may
perpetuate institutionalized racism and discrimination.
Additionally, stereotyping with race and gender presents unique
dangers. Because race and gender are highly visible and objectively
verifiable characteristics, consumers of statistical information tend to
overvalue their predictive worth.183 For example, an expert may
consider many variables when calculating an individual's future lost
earnings, including race, gender, socioeconomic status, educational
attainment, and projected income. However, in consuming this
178. Id. at 869.
179. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987) (rejecting an exception for evidence
suggesting that certain members of the jury were under the influence of drugs and alcohol
throughout the trial).
180. Warger v, Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) (rejecting an exception for evidence suggesting
that a juror lied about her pro-defendant biases during voir dire).
181. Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
182. SCHAUER, supra note 21, at 203.
183. Id. at 187.
2017] 1383
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
information, jurors may be predisposed to rely more heavily on the race
and gender aspects of this calculation because they can readily perceive
these attributes. Unlike educational attainment or socioeconomic
status (which may seem much more nebulous to jurors), verifying the
plaintiffs race or gender is an objective process. Therefore, with
something tangible to rely on, jurors may overestimate the predictive
worth of these variables.
III. POSSIBLE ANSWERS
A. The Nuclear Option: Remove All Statistical Indicators
Heeding constitutional and normative arguments against the
use of race-based and gendered statistics, one solution would be to
simply remove them from the calculation. This approach was
articulated by legislators in the proposed Fair Calculations in Civil
Damages Act, which seeks to "prohibit a court from awarding damages
based on race, ethnicity, gender, religion, or actual or perceived sexual
orientation."18 4
However, the effects of race have proven particularly difficult to
extinguish. For example, research suggests that socioeconomic status
complexly interacts with, and is likely confounded by, race.185
Understanding the racial component of socioeconomic status may be
incredibly demanding. To truly prevent damages awards based on race,
would experts also be barred from using data that could possibly be
confounded with race? If so, variables beyond simply prima facie race,
including highly predictive factors like socioeconomic status and
occupational attainment, would also need to be removed. The only
statistical evidence available would be based on a blended "average
person," with a complete disregard for individualized information
regarding the plaintiffs gender, race, socioeconomic status, occupation,
educational attainment, and other helpful qualifying variables.
Unfortunately, in practice, this method may remove any
semblance of accuracy from the process. If the purpose of these
calculations is to reimburse the plaintiff for losses suffered at the hands
of the defendant, should the goal not be to achieve the most accurate
184. H.R. 6417, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 3489, 114th Cong. (2016).
185. See, e.g., David R. Williams et al., Race, Socioeconomic Status and Health: Complexities,
Ongoing Challenges and Research Opportunities, 1186 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 69, 74 (2010) ("All
indicators of SES are strongly patterned by race, with SES being a key determinant of racial
disparities in health."); see also P.L. McCarthy et al., Race/Ethnicity, Gender, Socioeconomic
Status-Research Exploring Their Effects on Child Health: A Subject Review, 105 PEDIATRICS
1349, 1350 (2000); David R. Williams, Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects
of Racism and Discrimination, 896 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 173, 173-88 (1999).
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number possible? Removing these important qualifiers will ultimately
severely overcompensate certain persons, while severely
undercompensating others.186 Because these calculations are the result
of a great number of input factors, the removal of one factor may be to
the plaintiffs benefit, whereas the removal of another may be to his
detriment.
For example, once again consider John from the Introduction.187
John was the African American male raised in a nuclear family setting
whose parents held doctorate degrees and were employed as physicians.
Applying the proposed methodology, John's African American racial
status would be removed, thereby enhancing the amount of John's
award.188 However, at the same time, the additional information
regarding his parents' impressive educational and occupational
attainment would also be removed, as well as John's male gender. The
removal of this information, which if included would bode favorably for
John, severely decreases the value. Instead of receiving an award
capable of compensating John for the actual injuries sustained, the
figure instead represents a mean value devoid of any real assessment
of John's unique circumstances and actual lost earning capacity. The
goals of the tort system are likely not met by undercompensating John
to such a degree.
B. Affirmative Action Damages?
While many, including Judge Weinstein, explicitly reject the use
of race-based statistics in a discriminatory manner, perhaps this data
could be permitted when it would benefit a traditionally disadvantaged
plaintiff. Much like affirmative action in the education system, allowing
race-based and gendered statistics to apply in beneficial circumstances
may serve an important policy function. Such damages may compensate
individuals who previously faced discrimination as a result of their
membership in a certain racial class or may allow them to overcome
future adversities caused by their class membership.
In fact, this "affirmative action"-type function was explicitly
contemplated by Judge Weinstein outside of the damages context.189
Specifically, Judge Weinstein considered the use of race-based statistics
186. See infra Section III.B.
187. See supra Introduction.
188. With regard to life expectancy, the U.S. Life Tables suggest this would result in a
difference of 4.9 years. See infra Fig.2 (comparing the 71.1-year life expectancy of an African





as applied to the Graham rule, which states "that juveniles cannot be
kept in prison for a non-homicide offense for their full life without
parole."190 In that case, Judge Weinstein suggested that using
individualized race-based statistics could potentially reduce the
sentences for certain juvenile defendants with statistically shorter
lifespans.191
It is conceivable that a similar affirmative action-type
assessment could occur when calculating civil damages, with similarly
disadvantaged classes of people being provided with a "damages floor."




Neutral Caucasian American Hispanic
Gender- 78.5 years192  78.8 years193  74.5 years194  81.2 years95
Neutral
Male 76.0 years196  76.4 years1 97  71.1 years19 8 78.7 years1 99
Female 80.9 years200  81.2 yearS201  77.6 yearS 202 83.5 yearS20 3
Using a measure devoid of any race- or gender-based
information, the average life expectancy of an individual within the
United States population is 78.5 years. Thus, reliance on the blended
average increases the award available to an individual within the
overall African American population (74.5 years) and to an African
American male (71.1 years); it affirmatively assists the plaintiff and
ensures they are compensated to this "average" degree.
190. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 3d 126, 158 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S 48, 50 (2010)).
191. Id.
192. National Vital Statistics Reports-United States Life Tables 2009, CTR. FOR DISEASE
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However, reliance on the blended average actually works to the
detriment of the general Hispanic population (81.2 years), the average
Hispanic male (78.7 years), and all females: within the general United
States female population (80.9 years), the average Caucasian female
(81.2 years), the average African American female (77.6 years), and the
average Hispanic female (83.5 years). According to this outcome,
reliance on neutral statistics actually undercompensates certain racial
minorities and women. If the normative goal of monetary damages is to
"make the plaintiff whole again," then clearly using neutral statistics
fails at least some plaintiffs.
Therefore, a possible approach would be to rely on the neutral
statistics when it would assist the plaintiff (i.e., in the case of an African
American male), while applying the more individualized statistics
where the neutral measure would negatively impact the plaintiffs
award (i.e., in the case of a Hispanic female). An attempt to manipulate
the data in this way can be seen by the plaintiffs expert in G.M.M. ex
rel Hernandez, through his proposition that Hispanic children tend to
outperform their parents' educational attainment.204 In that case, the
expert suggested that the child's ethnicity be considered in order to
increase the final award.205 Instead of perpetuating the disadvantages
faced by minorities by awarding them less than their Caucasian male
counterparts, this approach seeks to equalize the end result.
Similar arguments can be made with respect to gender. When
considering gender-specific data in the lost earnings context, the ever-
referenced wage gap and female-to-male earnings ratio intuitively
suggest that women receive less. However, when assessing lost
earnings, it is important to consider women outside of the traditional
waged labor environment. While household labor is not currently
included in the United States gross domestic product (GDP), many
economists recognize contributions to the home as productive work.206
At trial, some jurisdictions allow experts to present evidence of lost
home production resulting from permanent impairment or death.207 To
value these lost contributions, many experts consider replacement cost,
which assesses these contributions according to the market value of the
services rendered.208 Thus, a plaintiff who makes meals, cleans, tutors
204. See supra Section I.C.
205. Id.
206. See Joni Hersch, Marriage, Household Production, and Earnings, in MARRIAGE AND THE
ECONoMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 211 (Shoshana
Grossbard-Schechtman ed., 2003).




her children, and performs maintenance work at home must be
compensated at the market rate for these services.209
Valuing this type of unwaged labor in calculations of lost
earnings allows women the opportunity to overcome the wage gap and
receive awards that more adequately describe their loss. Further,
contributions to the home likely continue long after the prescriptive
"retirement age" faced by most workers in the traditional waged
employment environment. Therefore, those performing home
contributions conceivably have a much longer worklife expectancy than
those engaged in the traditional workforce.
Thus, similar to race-based data, lost earnings calculations
involving gendered data could provide women with a "damages floor."
In instances where female-specific data results in a lesser earning
capacity, gender-neutral data should be used. However, where applying
female-specific data (including contributions to the home) result in a
greater award than the gender-neutral data, female-specific data should
be used.
Ultimately, there are multiple significant problems which such
an approach. Most notably, the rights of the defendants in such cases
must be considered. Assuming that the plaintiff may in fact be heavily
overcompensated in these situations, a single defendant is often
responsible for footing the bill for this remedial justice. Is it fair to place
society's burden of compensating the victim of systematic
discrimination on a single payer?
Another difficulty with "affirmative action damages" stems from
the reference class problem.210 While the average Hispanic male
generally outlives the average Caucasian male by 3.4 years, there are
numerous other variables that may ultimately suppress an individual
Hispanic male's award.211 Although using this race-specific statistic in
the initial lifespan determination increases the award, including other
variables such as Hispanic-specific educational attainment and
Hispanic-specific socioeconomic status may once again decrease the
value. Thus, in application, affirmative action damages are probably
not a practical solution when multiple conflicting variables are
considered.
209. Id.
210. See supra Section II.A.I.
211. See supra Fig.2.
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C. A More Temperate Approach: Removing Prima Facie Race-Based
and Gendered Statistics, While Employing Only the Most Recent
Available Data in Other Statistical Predictions
Ultimately, this Note argues a position similar to that of many
minority- and gender-rights advocates and demands the exclusion of
race-based and gendered data. From a basic evidentiary standpoint,
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence likely requires this
prohibition, given that the high danger of unfair prejudice clearly
outweighs the probative value of these considerations.2 12 However,
unlike the nuclear option mentioned above, this Note refuses to
completely discard all statistical predictions.213 To reconcile these
issues, the appropriate course of action requires the statutory exclusion
of prima facie race-based and gendered statistics, as was contemplated
by the proposed Fair Calculations in Civil Damages Act.2 1 4 As such, the
current practice of relying on race- and gender-indexed life tables will
be prohibited. Instead, experts may replace this data with more
individualized factors such as socioeconomic status and educational
attainment, which provide an equally capable proxy for meaningful
prediction, yet avoid the constitutional and social concerns associated
with race-based and gendered data. Particularly regarding
socioeconomic status, some scholars claim that the alleged negative
impacts suffered by racial minorities are primarily due to differences in
economic characteristics and geography as opposed to simply race.215
Therefore the prima facie removal of race will not affect the accuracy of
the award to a significant degree, so long as economic characteristics
and geography continue to be considered.
Once again, consider John from the Introduction.2 16 Under this
approach, John's status as an African American and a male would
necessarily be excluded from the analysis. However, the information
regarding his socioeconomic status, parents' educational attainment,
and other such factors would readily be included in expert analyses in
order to individualize the assessment. However, given the concept of
overfitting discussed in Section II.A, only a few of these variables should
be used at one time to create the statistical model.217 Although many of
212. FED. R. EVID. 403.
213. See supra Section III.A.
214. H.R. 6417, 114th Cong. (2016); S. 3489, 114th Cong. (2016).
215. Arline T. Geronimus et al., Inequality in Life Expectancy, Functional Status, and Active
Life Expectancy Across Selected Black and White Populations in the United States, 38
DEMOGRAPHY 227, 244 (2001).
216. See supra Introduction.
217. See supra Section II.A.I (discussing reference classes and the problem of overfitting).
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these factors may be confounded with race, they are also correlated with
things like personal drive, familial history, and, even to some degree,
chance. Therefore, including them allows the expert to paint an
accurately predictive picture of John's individual future earning
capacity, which of course is the very point of the damages award.
In addition, this solution envisions a statutory mandate
requiring any data used in these calculations to be continually updated,
so as to avoid perpetuating systematic discrimination against lower
socioeconomic status individuals. As such, any statistical measures
relied on by the expert must be based on data that is collected or
updated within five years from the date of the start of trial.
Remarkably, many forensic economists continue to rely on worklife
tables that are over thirty years old.2 18 Keeping data new and relevant
will prevent against what is likely the largest danger and criticism of
using race-based and gendered statistics: the opportunity for these
statistics to simply perpetuate discrimination against disadvantaged
populations. Additionally, relying on recently updated data will better
facilitate the inclusion of those individuals discussed in Section II.A
who are currently unaccounted for in many of the existing tables. While
relying on obsolete data preserves these discriminatory practices, data
collected within the last five years will better reflect important changes
in the social atmosphere.
It is not the statistician's duty to act as a social scientist to
determine what role discrimination plays in the numbers produced;
thus, this approach leaves the normative judgments to society and
instead simplifies statistical analysis to its most pure purpose:
achieving accurate predictive numbers based on existing data.
Removing race-based and gendered classifications allows the expert to
make an individualized determination based on the specific attributes
of the plaintiff, while excluding racist and sexist considerations.
Limiting the predictions to only the most recent data removes
hypothetical projections about future rates of change while ensuring
accuracy remains the key focus of the investigation.
Under this approach, major constitutional and social justice
concerns are quelled. At the same time, statistical predictions can
continue to assure the most accurate award is achieved, benefiting the
plaintiff, the defendant, and the greater tort system.
218. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 45.
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FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH
CONCLUSION
The use of predictive statistics is an integral part of damages
assessments in cases involving serious personal injury and death. The
speculative nature of future damages offers parties, their experts, and
the jury a great degree of latitude when calculating their estimated
awards. Despite clear social justice issues associated with their use,
race-based and gendered statistics and stereotypes have long infected
these assessments. Through life tables and complex expert calculations,
juries are continually encouraged to rely on the plaintiffs' immutable
race and gender when tasked with determining their "worth."
However, recent developments in judicial and legislative
thought suggest that race-based and gendered statistics will play a
more limited role at trial going forward. Despite the predictive nature
of these variables, the constitutional and impracticability hurdles
associated with their use suggest hat race and gender should no longer
dominate the discussion of future damages. Rather, revising the current
regime to replace race and gender with more fluid variables like
socioeconomic status will adequately capture much of the same
information while avoiding many of the dangers inherent in relying on
such controversial characteristics. Where the inputs are not prima facie
discriminatory and the integrity of the data can be ensured, both the
plaintiff and the defendant can continue to benefit from the inclusion of
forensic economics and statistical projections at trial.
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